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ABSTRACT
Federated learning facilitates the collaborative training of models
without the sharing of raw data. However, recent attacks demon-
strate that simply maintaining data locality during training pro-
cesses does not provide sufficient privacy guarantees. Rather, we
need a federated learning system capable of preventing inference
over both the messages exchanged during training and the final
trained model while ensuring the resulting model also has accept-
able predictive accuracy. Existing federated learning approaches
either use securemultiparty computation (SMC)which is vulnerable
to inference or differential privacy which can lead to low accuracy
given a large number of parties with relatively small amounts of
data each. In this paper, we present an alternative approach that uti-
lizes both differential privacy and SMC to balance these trade-offs.
Combining differential privacy with secure multiparty computation
enables us to reduce the growth of noise injection as the number
of parties increases without sacrificing privacy while maintaining
a pre-defined rate of trust. Our system is therefore a scalable ap-
proach that protects against inference threats and produces models
with high accuracy. Additionally, our system can be used to train
a variety of machine learning models, which we validate with ex-
perimental results on 3 different machine learning algorithms. Our
experiments demonstrate that our approach out-performs state of
the art solutions.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Privacy-preserving protocols; Trust
frameworks; •Computingmethodologies→Learning settings.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In traditional machine learning (ML) environments, training data is
centrally held by one organization executing the learning algorithm.
Distributed learning systems extend this approach by using a set
of learning nodes accessing shared data or having the data sent to
the participating nodes from a central node, all of which are fully
trusted. For example, MLlib from Apache Spark assumes a trusted
central node to coordinate distributed learning processes [28]. An-
other approach is the parameter server [26], which again requires a
fully trusted central node to collect and aggregate parameters from
the many nodes learning on their different datasets.
However, some learning scenarios must address less open trust
boundaries, particularly when multiple organizations are involved.
While a larger dataset improves the performance of a trained model,
organizations often cannot share data due to legal restrictions or
competition between participants. For example, consider three hos-
pitals with different owners serving the same city. Rather than each
hospital creating their own predictive model forecasting cancer
risks for their patients, the hospitals want to create a model learned
over the whole patient population. However, privacy laws prohibit
them from sharing their patients’ data. Similarly, a service provider
may collect usage data both in Europe and the United States. Due
to legislative restrictions, the service provider’s data cannot be
stored in one central location. When creating a predictive model
forecasting service usage, however, all datasets should be used.
The area of federated learning (FL) addresses these more restric-
tive environments wherein data holders collaborate throughout the
learning process rather than relying on a trusted third party to hold
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data [6, 39]. Data holders in FL run a machine learning algorithm
locally and only exchange model parameters, which are aggregated
and redistributed by one or more central entities. However, this
approach is not sufficient to provide reasonable data privacy guar-
antees. We must also consider that information can be inferred
from the learning process [30] and that information that can be
traced back to its source in the resulting trained model [40].
Some previous work has proposed a trusted aggregator as a way
to control privacy exposure [1], [32]. FL schemes using Local Dif-
ferential Privacy also address the privacy problem [39] but entails
adding too much noise to model parameter data from each node,
often yielding poor performance of the resulting model.
We propose a novel federated learning system which provides
formal privacy guarantees, accounts for various trust scenarios,
and produces models with increased accuracy when compared
with existing privacy-preserving approaches. Data never leaves
the participants and privacy is guaranteed using secure multiparty
computation (SMC) and differential privacy. We account for po-
tential inference from individual participants as well as the risk of
collusion amongst the participating parties through a customizable
trust threshold. Our contributions are the following:
• We propose and implement an FL system providing formal
privacy guarantees and models with improved accuracy com-
pared to existing approaches.
• We include a tunable trust parameter which accounts for
various trust scenarios while maintaining the improved ac-
curacy and formal privacy guarantees.
• We demonstrate that it is possible to use the proposed ap-
proach to train a variety of ML models through the exper-
imental evaluation of our system with three significantly
different ML models: decision trees, convolutional neural
networks and linear support vector machines.
• We include the first federated approach for the private and
accurate training of a neural network model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We outline the
building blocks in our system. We then discuss the various privacy
considerations in FL systems followed by outlining our threat model
and general system. We then provide experimental evaluation and
discussion of the system implementation process. Finally, we give
an overview of related work and some concluding remarks.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section we introduce building blocks of our approach and
explain how various approaches fail to protect data privacy in FL.
2.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) is a rigorous mathematical framework
wherein an algorithm may be described as differentially private if
and only if the inclusion of a single instance in the training dataset
causes only statistically insignificant changes to the algorithm’s
output. For example, consider private medical information from
a particular hospital. The authors in [40] have shown that with
access to only a trained ML model, attackers can infer whether
or not an individual was a patient at the hospital, violating their
right to privacy. DP puts a theoretical limit on the influence of a
single individual, thus limiting an attacker’s ability to infer such
membership. The formal definition for DP is [13]:
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy). A randomized mecha-
nismK provides (ϵ,δ )- differential privacy if for any two neighboring
databaseD1 andD2 that differ in only a single entry, ∀S ⊆ Ranдe(K),
Pr(K(D1) ∈ S) ≤ eϵ Pr(K(D2) ∈ S) + δ (1)
If δ = 0, K is said to satisfy ϵ-differential privacy.
To achieve DP, noise is added to the algorithm’s output. This
noise is proportional to the sensitivity of the output, where sen-
sitivity measures the maximum change of the output due to the
inclusion of a single data instance.
Two popular mechanisms for achieving DP are the Laplacian
and Gaussian mechanisms. Gaussian is defined by
M(D) ≜ f (D) + N (0, S2f σ 2), (2)
where N (0, S2f σ 2) is the normal distribution with mean 0 and stan-
dard deviation Sf σ . A single application of the Gaussianmechanism
to function f of sensitivity Sf satisfies (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy if
δ ≥ 54exp(−(σϵ)2/2) and ϵ < 1 [16].
To achieve ϵ-differential privacy, the Laplace mechanism may be
used in the same manner by substituting N (0, S2f σ 2) with random
variables drawn from Lap(Sf /ϵ) [16].
When an algorithm requires multiple additive noise mechanisms,
the evaluation of the privacy guarantee follows from the basic com-
position theorem [14, 15] or from advanced composition theorems
and their extensions [7, 17, 18, 23].
2.2 Threshold Homomorphic Encryption
An additively homomorphic encryption scheme is one wherein the
following property is guaranteed:
Enc(m1) ◦ Enc(m2) = Enc(m1 +m2),
for some predefined function ◦. Such schemes are popular in privacy-
preserving data analytics as untrusted parties can perform opera-
tions on encrypted values.
One such additive homomorphic scheme is the Paillier cryptosys-
tem [31], a probabilistic encryption scheme based on computations
in the group Z∗n2 , where n is an RSA modulus. In [11] the authors
extend this encryption scheme and propose a threshold variant. In
the threshold variant, a set of participants is able to share the secret
key such that no subset of the parties smaller than a pre-defined
threshold is able to decrypt values.
2.3 Privacy in Federated Learning
In centralized learning environments a single party P using a dataset
D executes some learning algorithm fM resulting in a model M
where fM (D) = M . In this case P has access to the complete dataset
D. By contrast, in a federated learning environment, multiple parties
P1, P2, ..., Pn , each have their own dataset D1,D2, ...,Dn , respec-
tively. The goal is then to learn a model using all of the datasets.
Wemust consider two potential threats to data privacy in such an
FL environment: (1) inference during the learning process and (2) in-
ference over the outputs. Inference during the learning process refers
to any participant in the federation inferring information about an-
other participant’s private dataset given the data exchanged during
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the execution of fM . Inference over the outputs refers to the leakage
of any participants’ data from intermediate outputs as well asM .
We consider two types of inference attacks: insider and outsider.
Insider attacks include those launched by participants in the FL
system, including both data holders as well as any third parties,
while outsider attacks include those launched both by eavesdroppers
to the communication between participants and by users of the
final predictive model when deployed as a service.
2.3.1 Inference during the learning process. Let us consider fM as
the combination of computational operations and a set of queries
Q1,Q2, ...,Qk . That is, for each step s in fM requiring knowledge
of the parties’ data there is a queryQs . In the execution of fM each
party Pi must respond to each such query Qs with appropriate
information on Di . The types of queries are highly dependent on
fM . For example, to build a decision tree, a query may request
the number of instances in Di matching a certain criteria. In con-
trast, to train an SVM or neural network a query would request
model parameters after a certain number of training iterations. Any
privacy-preserving FL systemmust account for the risk of inference
over the responses to these queries.
Privacy-preserving ML approaches addressing this risk often
do so by using secure multiparty computation (SMC). Generally,
SMC protocols allow n parties to obtain the output of a function
over their n inputs while preventing knowledge of anything other
than this output [20]. Unfortunately, approaches exclusively using
secure multiparty computation remain vulnerable to inference over
the output. As the function output remains unchanged from func-
tion execution without privacy, the output can reveal information
about individual inputs. Therefore, we must also consider potential
inference over outputs.
2.3.2 Inference over the outputs. This refers to intermediate out-
puts available to participants as well as the predictive model. Recent
work shows that given only black-box access to the model through
an ML as a service API, an attacker can still make training data
inferences [40]. An FL system should prevent such outsider attacks
while also considering insiders. That is, participant Pi should not
be able to infer information about D j when i , j as shown in [30].
Solutions addressing privacy of output often make use of the DP
framework discussed in Preliminaries. As a mechanism satisfying
differential privacy guarantees that if an individual contained in a
given dataset is removed, no outputs would become significantly
more or less likely [13], a learning algorithm fM which is theoreti-
cally proven to be ϵ-differentially private is guaranteed to have a
certain privacy of output quantified by the ϵ privacy parameter.
In the federated learning setting it is important to note that the
definition of neighboring databases is consistent with the usual
DP definition – that is, privacy is provided at the individual record
level, not the party level (which may represent many individuals).
3 AN END-TO-END APPROACHWITH TRUST
3.1 Threat Model
We propose a system wherein n data parties use an ML service for
FL.We refer to this service as the aggregator. Our system is designed
to withstand three potential adversaries: (1) the aggregator, (2) the
data parties, and (3) outsiders.
3.1.1 Honest-But-Curious Aggregator. The honest-but-curious or
semi-honest adversarial model is commonly used in the field of SMC
since its introduction in [3] and application to data mining in [27].
Honest-but-curious adversaries follow the protocol instructions
correctly but will try to learn additional information. Therefore,
the aggregator will not vary from the predetermined ML algorithm
but will attempt to infer private information using all data received
throughout the protocol execution.
3.1.2 Colluding Parties. Our work also considers the threat of
collusion among parties, including the aggregator, through the
trust parameter t which is the minimum number of non-colluding
parties. Additionally, in contrast to the aggregator, we consider
scenarios in which parties in P may deviate from the protocol
execution to achieve additional information on data held by honest
parties.
3.1.3 Outsiders. We also consider potential attacks from adver-
saries outside of the system. Our work ensures that any adversary
monitoring communications during training cannot infer the pri-
vate data of the participants. We also consider users of the final
model as potential adversaries. A predictive model output from our
system may therefore be deployed as a service, remaining resilient
to inference against adversaries who may be users of the service.
We now detail the assumptions made in our system to more
concretely formulate our threat model.
3.1.4 Communication. We assume secure channels between each
party and the aggregator. This allows the aggregator to authenticate
incoming messages and prevents an adversary, whether they be an
outsider or malicious data party, from injecting their own responses.
3.1.5 System set up. We additionally make use of the threshold
variant of the Paillier encryption scheme from [11] assuming secure
key distribution. It is sufficient within our system to say that se-
mantic security of encrypted communication is equivalent to the
decisional composite residuosity assumption. For further discussion
we direct the reader to [11]. Our use of the threshold variant of the
Paillier system ensures that any set of n − t or fewer parties can-
not decrypt ciphertexts. Within the context of our FL system, this
ensures the privacy of individual messages sent to the aggregator.
3.2 Proposed Approach
We propose an FL system that addresses risk of inference during
the learning process, risk of inference over the outputs, and trust.
We combine methods from SMC and DP to develop protocols that
guarantee privacy without sacrificing accuracy.
We consider the following scenario. There exists a set of n parties
P = P1, P2, ..., Pn , a set of disjoint datasetsD1,D2, ...,Dn belonging
to the respective parties and adhering to the same structure, and
an aggregator A. Our system takes as additional input three pa-
rameters: fM , ϵ, and t . fM specifies the training algorithm, ϵ is the
privacy guarantee against inference, and t specifies the minimum
number of honest, non-colluding parties.
The aggregator A runs the learning algorithm fM consisting
of k or fewer linear queries Q1,Q2, ...,Qk , each requiring infor-
mation from the n datasets. This information may include model
parameters after some local learning on each dataset or may be
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Figure 1: System Overview
more traditionally queried information such as how many individ-
uals match a set of criterion. For each algorithm deployed into our
system, any step s requiring such information reflective of some
analysis on the private, local datasets must be represented by a
corresponding query Qs . Figure 1 shows an outline of a step s in
fM . Using secure channels between A and each of the parties, the
aggregator will send query Qs . Each party will then calculate a
response using their respective datasets. The participant will use a
differential privacy mechanism that depends on the algorithm fM
to add the appropriate amount of noise according to the privacy
budget allocated to that step, the sensitivity of Qs , and the level
of trust in the system. The noisy response is then encrypted using
the threshold variant of the Paillier cryptosystem and sent to A.
Homomorphic properties then allowA to aggregate the individual
responses. A subsequently queries at least n − t + 1 data parties
to decrypt the aggregate value and updates the model M . At the
conclusion of fM , the modelM is exposed to all participants. This
process is outlined in Algorithm 1.
We consider trust with respect to collusion in two steps: (1) in
the addition of noise and (2) in the threshold setting of the encryp-
tion scheme. The more participants colluding, the more knowledge
which is available to infer the data of an honest participant. There-
fore, the noise introduced by an honest participant must account
for collusion. The use of homomorphic encryption however allows
for significant increases in accuracy (over local privacy approaches).
We now detail this strategy for FL.
3.3 Reducing Noise with SMC
A key component to our system is the ability to reduce noise by
leveraging the SMC framework while considering a customizable
trust parameter.
Specifically, let σs and Ss respectively be the noise parameter
and sensitivity to step Qs allocated a budget ϵs in the learning
algorithm fM . In a traditional application of differential privacy to
federated learning, each party will use the Gaussian mechanism to
add N (0, S2sσ 2s ) noise to their response ri,s when queried by A at
step Qs . This guarantees the privacy of each ri,s .
If, however, each ri,s is encrypted using the scheme proposed
in [11] with a threshold setting of t¯ = n − t + 1, the noise may
be reduced by a factor of t − 1. Rather than returning Qs (Di ) +
N (0, S2sσ 2s ), each party may return Enc(Qs (Di ) + N (0, S2s σ
2
s
t−1 )).
Note that when A aggregates these responses the value that is
eventually decrypted and exposed will be
∑n
i=1 Qs (Pi ) + Yi where
Algorithm 1 Private Federated Learning
Input: ML algorithm fM ; set of data parties P of size N , with each Pi ∈ P holding
a private datasetDi and a portion of the secret key ski ; minimum number of honest,
non-colluding parties t ; privacy guarantee ϵ
t¯ = n − t + 1
for each Qs ∈ fM do
for each Pi ∈ P do
A asynchronously queries Pi with Qs
Pi sends ri,s = Encpk (Qs (Di ) + noise(ϵ, t ))
end for
A aggregates Encpk (rs ) ← r1,s ◦ r2,s ◦ ... ◦ rN ,s
A selects Pdec ⊆ P such that |Pdec | = t¯
for each Pi ∈ Pdec do
A asynchronously queries Pi with Encpk (rs )
A receives partial decryption of rs from Pi using ski
end for
A computes rs from partial decryptions
A updates M with rs
end for
return M
each Yi is drawn from the Gaussian distribution with standard
deviation Ss σs√t−1 . This is equivalent to N (0, S
2
s
nσ 2s
t−1 )
∑n
i=1 Qs (Di ).
Since we know that t − 1 < n, the noise included in the decrypted
value is strictly greater than that required to satisfy DP. Additionally,
the encryption scheme guarantees that the maximum number of
colluders, t¯ , cannot decrypt values of honest parties.
Given this approach, we are able to maintain the customizable na-
ture of our system with the trust parameter t and the formal privacy
guarantees of the DP framework while decreasing the amount of
noise for each query response leading to more accurate ML models.
4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section we empirically demonstrate how to apply our ap-
proach to train three distinct learning models: decision trees (DT),
convolutional neural networks (CNN) and linear Support Vector
Machines (SVM). We additionally provide analysis on the impact
of certain settings on the performance of our approach.
4.1 Decision Trees
We first consider DT learning using the ID3 algorithm. In this
scenario, each dataset Di owned by some Pi ∈ P contains a set of
instances described by the same set of categorical features F and
a class attribute C . The aggregator initializes the DT model with
a root node. Then, the feature F ∈ F that maximizes information
gain is chosen based on counts queried from each party in P and
child nodes are generated for each possible value of F . The feature
F is then removed from F . This process continues recursively for
each child node until either (a) there are no more features in F , (b)
a pre-determined max-depth is reached, or (c) responses are too
noisy to be deemed meaningful. This process is specifically detailed
as algorithmic pseudocode in Section 5.1.
There are two types of participant queries in private, federated
DT learning: counts and class_counts. For executing these queriesA
first divides the entire privacy budget ϵ equally between each layer
of the tree. According to the composition property of differential
privacy, because different nodes within the same layer are evaluated
on disjoint subsets of the datasets, they do not accumulate privacy
loss and therefore the budget allocated to a single layer is not
divided further.Within each node, half of the budget (ϵ1) is allocated
to determining total counts and half is allocated to either class
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Figure 2: Effect of privacy budgets on the overall F1-score
for Decision Trees
counts (done at the leaf nodes) or evaluating attributes (done at
internal nodes). For internal nodes, each feature is evaluated for
potential splitting against the same dataset. The budget allocated
to evaluating attributes must therefore be divided amongst each
feature (ϵ2). In all experiments the max depth is set to d = |F |2 .
Dataset. We conduct a number of experiments using the Nurs-
ery dataset from the UCI Machine Learning Repository [12]. This
dataset contains 8 categorical attributes about 12,960 nursery school
applications. The target attribute has five distinct classes with the
following distribution: 33.333%, 0.015%, 2.531%, 32.917%, 31.204%.
Comparison Methods. To put model performance into context,
we compare with two different random baselines and two current
FL approaches. Random baselines enable us to characterize when a
particular approach is no longer learning meaningful information
while the FL approaches visualize relative performance cost.
(1) Uniform Guess. In this approach, class predictions are ran-
domly sampled with a 1|C | chance for each class.
(2) RandomGuess. Randomguess improves uponUniformGuess
with consideration of class value distribution in the training
data. At test time, each prediction is sampled from the set of
training class labels.
(3) Local DP. In the local approach, parties add noise to protect
the privacy of their own data in isolation. The amount of
noise necessary to provide ϵ-differential privacy to each
dataset is defined in [5].
(4) No Privacy. This is the result of running the distributed
learning algorithm without any privacy guarantee.
4.1.1 Variation in Settings. We now look at how different set-
tings impact results.
Privacy Budget. We first look at the impact of the privacy budget
on performance in our system. To isolate the impact of the privacy
budget we set the number of parties, |P |, to 10 and assume no collu-
sion. We consider budget values between 0.05 and 2.0. Recall from
Preliminaries that for a mechanism to be ϵ-differentially private
the amount of noise added will be inversely proportional to value
of ϵ . In other words, the smaller the ϵ value, the smaller the privacy
budget, and the more noise added to each query.
We can see in Figure 2 that our approach maintains an F1-score
above 0.8 for privacy budgets as small as 0.4. Once the budget dips
below 0.4 we see the noise begins to overwhelm the information
being provided which can have one of two outcomes: (1) learning
pre-maturely haults or (2) learning become inaccurate. This results
0.0
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Figure 3: Effect of increasing number of parties on the over-
all F1-score for Decision Trees
in degraded performance as the budget decreases, which is expected.
It is clear that our approach maintains improved performance over
the local DP approach for all budgets (until both approaches con-
verge to the random guessing baseline). Particularly as the budget
decreases from 1.0 to 0.4 we see our approach maintaining better
resilience to the decrease in the privacy budget.
Number of Parties. Another important consideration for FL sys-
tems is the ability to maintain accuracy in highly distributed sce-
narios. That is, when many parties, each with a small amount of
data, such as in an IoT scenario, are contributing to the learning.
In Figures 3 and 4 we show the impact that |P | has on perfor-
mance. The results are for a fixed overall privacy budget of 0.5 and
assume no collusion. For each experiment, the overall dataset was
divided into |P | equal sized partitions.
The results in Figure 3 demonstrate the viability of our system
for FL in highly distributed environments while highlighting the
shortcomings of the local DP approach. As |P | increases, the noise
in the local DP approach increases proportionally while our ap-
proach maintains consistent accuracy. We can see that with as few
as 25 parties, the local DP results begin to approach the baseline
and even dip below random guessing by 100 participants.
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Figure 4: Decision Tree Training Time with Encryption
Another consideration relative to the scaling of participants is
the overhead of encryption. Figure 4 highlights the scalability of our
system, showing the impact that encryption has on overall training
time in our system as the number of parties increases from 1 to 10.
While the entire system experiences a steady increase in cost as
the number of participants increases, the impact of the encryption
remains consistent. Because our system is designed for a distributed
scenario, the interactions with the aggregator are done in parallel
and therefore the overhead of encryption remains constant as the
number of parties increases.
Trust. An important part of our system is the trust parameter.
While the definition of a neighboring database within the con-
text of the differential privacy framework considers privacy at the
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Figure 5: Query Epsilons in Decision Tree Training with
Varying Rate of Trust (50 parties). Epsilon 1 is defined as the
privacy budget for count queries while Epsilon 2 is used for
class counts.
record level, the trust model for adversarial knowledge is consid-
ered within the context of the entire system. The trust parameter
therefore represents the degree of adversarial knowledge by cap-
turing the maximum number of colluding parties which the system
may tolerate. Figure 5 demonstrates how the ϵ values used for both
count and distribution queries in private, federated DT learning are
impacted by the trust parameter setting when |P | = 50.
In the worst case scenario where a party Pi ∈ P assumes that
all other Pj ∈ P, i , j are colluding, our approach converges with
existing local DP approaches. In all other scenarios the query ϵ
values will be increased in our system leading to more accurate
outcomes. Additionally, we believe the aforementioned scenario of
no trust is unlikely to exist in real world instances. Let us consider
smart phone users as an IoT example. Collusion of all but one
party is impractical not only due to scale but also since such a
system is likely the be running without many users even knowing.
Additionally, on a smaller scale, if there is a set of five parties in
the system and one party is concerned that the other four are all
colluding, there is no reason for the honest party to continue to
participate. We therefore believe that realistic scenarios of FL will
see accuracy gains when deploying our system.
4.2 Convolutional Neural Networks
We additionally demonstrate how to use our method to train a
distributed differentially private CNN. In our approach, similarly
to centrally trained CNNs, each party is sent a model with the
same initial structure and randomly initialized parameters. Each
party will then conduct one full epoch of learning locally. At the
conclusion of each batch, Gaussian noise is introduced according
to the norm clipping value c and the privacy parameter σ . Norm
clipping allows us to put a bound on the sensitivity of the gradient
update.We use the same privacy strategy used in the centralized
training approach presented in [1]. Once an entire epoch, or 1b
batches where b = batch rate, has completed the final parameters
are sent back to A. A then averages the parameters and sends
back an updated model for another epoch of learning. After a pre-
determined E number of epochs, the final modelM is output. This
process for the aggregator and data parties are specifically detailed
as algorithmic pseudocode in Section 5.2.
Within our private, federatedNN learning system, ifσ = √2 · log 1.25δ /ϵ
then by [16] our approach is (ϵ,δ )-differentially private with respect
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Figure 6: Convolutional Neural Network Training with
MNIST Data (10 parties and σ = 8, (ϵ , δ ) = (0.5, 10−5))
to each randomly sampled batch. Using the moments accountant
in [1], our approach is (O(bϵ√E/b),δ )-DP overall.
Dataset and Model Structure. For our CNN experiments we use
the publicly available MNIST dataset. This includes 60,000 training
instances of handwritten digits and 10,000 testing instances. Each
example is a 28x28 grey-scale image of a digit between 0 and 9 [24].
We use a model structure similar to that in [1]. Our model is a
feedforward neural network with 2 internal layers of ReLU units
and a softmax layer of 10 classes with cross-entropy loss. The first
layer contains 60 units and the second layer contains 1000. We set
the norm clipping to 4.0, learning rate to 0.1 and batch rate to 0.01.
We use Keras with a Tensorflow backend.
Comparison Methods. To the best of our knowledge, this paper
presents the first approach to accurately train a neural network
in a private federated fashion without reliance on any public or
non-protected data. We therefore compare our approach with the
following baselines:
(1) Central Data Holder, No Privacy. In this approach all the data
is centrally held by one party and no privacy is considered
in the learning process.
(2) Central Data Holder, With Privacy. While all the data is still
centrally held by one entity, this data holder now conducts
privacy-preserving learning. This is representative of the
scenario in [1].
(3) Distributed, No Privacy. In this approach the data is dis-
tributed to multiple parties, but the parties do not add noise
during the learning process.
(4) Local DP. Parties add noise to protect the privacy of their
own data in isolation, adapting from [1] and [39].
Figure 6 shows results with 10 parties conducting 100 epochs of
training with the privacy parameter σ set to 8.0, the “large noise”
setting in [1]. Note that Central Data Holder, No Privacy and Dis-
tributed Data, No Privacy achieve similar results and thus overlap.
Our model is able to achieve an F1-score in this setting of 0.9. While
this is lower than the central data holder setting where an F1-score
of approximately 0.95 is achieved, our approach again significantly
out-performs the local approach which only reaches 0.723. Addi-
tionally, we see a drop off in the performance of the local approach
early on as updates become overwhelmed by noise.
We additionally experiment with σ = 4 and σ = 2 as was done
in [1]. When σ = 4 ((ϵ , δ ) = (2, 10−5)) the central data holder with
privacy is able to reach an F1 score of 0.960, the local approach
reaches 0.864, and our approach results in an F1-score of 0.957.
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Figure 7: Degree of Noise in Convolutional Neural Network
Training with Varying Rate of Trust
When σ = 2 ((ϵ , δ ) = (8, 10−5)) those scores become 0.973, 0.937,
and 0.963 respectively. We can see that our approach therefore
demonstrates the most gain with larger σ values which translates
to tighter privacy guarantees.
Figure 7 again shows how the standard deviation of noise is
significantly decreased in our system for most scenarios.
Our experiments demonstrate that the encryption time for one
parameter at a party Pi takes approximately 0.001095 sec while
decryption betweenA and Pdec takes 0.007112 sec. While each pa-
rameter requires encryption and decryption, these processes can be
done completely in parallel. Therefore overhead remains relatively
constant as both |P | and the number of parameters increase.
Overall, we have demonstrated that our system provides signif-
icant accuracy gains for FL compared with local DP in plausible,
real world scenarios and scales well.
4.3 Support Vector Machines (SVM)
We also demonstrate and assess our approach when solving a classic
ℓ2-regularized binary linear SVM problem with hinge loss.
To train the linear SVM in a private distributed fashion, the
aggregator distributes a model with the same weight vectorw to
all parties. Each party then runs a predefined number of epochs to
learn locally. To apply differential privacy in this setting, we first
perform norm clipping on the feature vector x to obtain a bound
on the sensitivity of the gradient update. Then, Gaussian noise is
added to the gradient according to [25]. After each party completes
its local training, the final noisy encrypted weights are sent back
to the aggregator. The aggregator averages the encrypted weights
and sends back an updated model with a new weight vector for
another epoch of learning. Training ends after a predefined number
of epochs. The detailed process is presented in Section 5.3.
Dataset. We use the publicly available ‘gisette’ dataset, which
was used for NIPS 2003 Feature Selection Challenge [9]. This dataset
has 6, 000 training and 1, 000 testing samples with 5, 000 features.
Comparison Methods. We contrast the performance of our ap-
proach against other ways to train the model.
(1) Central, No Privacy. Centralized training without privacy.
(2) Central DP. Centralized training with DP.
(3) Distributed, No Privacy. Model trained through federated
learning without privacy.
(4) Local DP. In this approach each party adds enough noise
independently to protect their data according to [5].
In these experiments, the learning rate was set to 0.01 for all
settings. We used 100 epochs for all approaches. Additionally, for
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Figure 8: Linear SVM Training(10 parties and (ϵ , δ ) = (5,
0.0059))
FL methods, each party runs 10 epochs locally. We used 10 non-
colluding parties. Using σ=4, we report findings to achieve (ϵ,δ ) =
(5, 0.0059) according to [7].
Figure 8 shows F1-scores for the evaluated training methods.
Central, No Privacy and Distributed, No Privacy perform simi-
larly with F1-scores around 0.99 after fewer than 10 epochs due to
the balanced nature of the dataset. Among the privacy-preserving
approaches, Central DP introduces the least noise and achieves
the highest F1-score. Among private FL methods, our approach
achieves an F1-score over 0.87 which is almost equal to Central DP
and significantly out-performs Local DP after 100 epochs.
We also evaluated our system in a lower trust setting with only
half of the parties trusted as non-colluding. Our approach again out-
performed Local DP. Specifically, after 100 epochs, our approach
reached an F1-score of 0.85, while the Local DP achieves only 0.75.
These experimental results show that our approach consistently
out-performs state of the art methods to train different ML models
in a private FL fashion. We similarly showed that our approach
consistently out-performs baselines such as random guessing while
remaining reasonably close to non-private settings.
5 SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
The development and deployment of newmachine learning training
algorithms to our system requires the training process be first
broken down into a set of queries in which meaningful aggregation
may be done via summation. Each query must then be analyzed
for its privacy impact and and designated a portion of the overall
privacy budget. Additionally, support must exist at each party for
each type of query required by the private training algorithm. We
will now provide implementation details for each of the model types
evaluated, Decision Trees, Neural Networks, and Support Vector
Machines, with additional discussion on the applicability of our
framework to machine learning algorithms for other model types.
5.1 Application to Private Decision Tree
Training
DT learning follows these steps: (1) determine the feature which
best splits the training data, (2) split the training data into subsets
according to the chosen feature, (3) repeat steps (1) and (2) for
each subset. This is repeated until the subsets have reached a pre-
determined level of uniformity with respect to the target variable.
To conduct private decision tree learning in our system we first
address step (1): determining the best feature on which to split the
data. We define the “best” feature as the feature which maximizes
information gain. This is the same metric used in the ID3 [34],
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Algorithm 2 Private Decision Tree Learning
Input: Set of data parties P; minimum number of honest, non-colluding parties t ;
privacy guarantee ϵ ; attribute set F; class attributeC ; max tree depth d ; public key
pk
t¯ = n − t + 1
ϵ1 = ϵ2(d+1)
Define current splits, S = ∅, for root node
M = BuildTree(S, P, t , ϵ1 , F, C , d , pk )
return M
procedure BuildTree(S, P, t , ϵ1 , F, C , d , pk )
f = maxF ∈F |F |
Asynchronously query P: counts(S, ϵ1 , t )
N = decrypted aggregate of noisy counts
if F = ∅ or d = 0 or Nf |C | <
√
2
ϵ1
then
Asynchronously query P: class_counts(S, ϵ1 , t )
Nc = vector of decrypted, noisy class counts
return node labeled with arg maxc Nc
else
ϵ2 =
ϵ1
2|F|
for each F ∈ F do
for each fi ∈ F do
Update set of split values to send to child node: Si = S + {F = fi }
Asynchronously query P: counts(Si , ϵ2 , t )
and class_counts(Si , ϵ2 , t )
N ′Fi = aggregate of counts
N ′Fi,c = element-wise aggregate of class_counts
Recover N Fi from t¯ partial decryptions of N
′F
i
Recover N Fi,c from t¯ partial decryptions of N
′F
i,c
end for
VF =
∑|F |
i=1
∑|C |
c=1 N
F
i,c · log
N Fi,c
N Fi
end for
F¯ = arg maxF VF
Create root node M with label F¯
for each fi ∈ F¯ do
Si = S + {F = fi }
Mi = BuildTree(Si , P, t , ϵ1 , F \ F¯ , C , d − 1, pk )
Set Mi as child of M with edge fi
end for
return M
end if
end procedure
C4.5 [35] and C5.0 [36] tree training algorithms. Information gain
for a candidate feature f quantifies the difference between the
entropy of the current data with the weighted sum of the entropy
values for each of the data subsets which would be generated if f
were to be chosen as the splitting feature. Entropy for a dataset (or
subset) D is computed via the following equation:
Entropy(D) =
|C |∑
i=1
pi log2pi (3)
where C is the set of potential class values and pi indicates the
probability that a random instance in D is of class i . Therefore, the
selection of the “best” feature on which to switch can be chosen
via determining class probabilities which in turn may be computed
via counts. Queries to the parties from the aggregator are therefore
counts and class counts, known to have a sensitivity of 1.
Given the ability to query parties for class counts the aggregator
may then control the iterative learning process. To ensure this
process is differentially private according to a pre-defined privacy
budget, we follow the approach from [19] to divide the budget for
each iteration and set a fixed number of iterations rather than a
purity test as a stopping condition. The algorithm will also stop if
counts appear too small relative to the degree of noise to provide
meaningful information. The resulting private algorithm deployed
in our system is detailed in Algorithm 2.
5.2 Application to Private Neural Network
Training
The process of deploying our system for neural network learning
is distinct from the process outlined in the previous section for
decision tree learning. In central neural network training, after a
randomly initialized model of pre-defined structure is created, the
following process is used: (1) the dataset D is shuffled and then
equally divided into batches, (2) each batch is passed through the
model iteratively, (3) a loss function L is used to compute the
error of the model on each batch, (4) errors are then propagated
back through the network where an optimizer such as Stochastic
Gradient Descent (SGD) is used to update network weights before
processing the next batch. Steps (1) through (4) constitute one
epoch of learning and are repeated until the model converges (stops
demonstrating improved performance).
In our system we equate one query to the data parties as one
epoch of local learning. That is, each party conducts steps (1)
through (4) for one iteration and then sends an updated model
to the aggregator. The aggregator then averages the new model
weights provided by each party. An updated model is then sent
along with a new query for another epoch of learning to each party.
Algorithm 3 Private CNN Learning: Aggregator
Input: Set of data parties P; minimum number of honest, non-colluding parties t ;
noise parameter σ ; learning rate η; sampling probability b ; loss function L; clipping
value c ; number of epochs E ; public key pk
t¯ = n − t + 1
Initialize model M with random weights θ ;
for each e ∈ [E] do
Asynchronously query P:
train_epoch(M , η, b , L, c , σ , t )
θe = decrypted aggregate, noisy parameters from P
M ← θe
end for
return M
Each epoch receives the noise parameter σ and cost to the overall
privacy budget is determined through a separate privacy accoun-
tant utility. Just as the decision tree stopping condition was replaced
with a pre-set depth the neural network stopping condition of con-
vergence is replaced with a pre-defined number of epochs E. This
process from the aggregator perspective is outlined Algorithm 3.
At each data party we deploy code to support the process de-
tailed in Algorithm 4. To conduct a complete epoch of learning we
follow the approach proposed in [1] for private centralized neural
network learning. This requires a number of changes to the tra-
ditional learning approach. Rather than shuffling the dataset into
equal sized batches, a batch is randomly sampled for processing
with sampling probability b. An epoch then becomes defined as
the number of batch iterations required to process |Di | instances.
Additionally, parameter updates determined through the loss func-
tion L are clipped to define the sensitivity of the neural network
learning to individual training instances. Noise is then added to
the weight updates. Once an entire epoch is completed the updated
weights can be sent back to the aggregator.
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Algorithm 4 Private CNN Learning: Data Party Pi
procedure train_epoch(M , η, b , L, c , σ , t )
θ = parameters of M
for j ∈ {1, 2, ..., 1b } do
Randomly sample Di, j from Di w/ probability b
for each d ∈ Di, j do
gj(d ) ← ▽θL(θ, d )
g¯j(d ) ← gj (d )/ max
(
1, | |gj (d )| |2c
)
end for
g¯j ← 1|Di, j |
(∑
∀d g¯j(d ) + N
(
0, c2 · σ 2t−1
))
θ ← θ − ηg¯j
M ← θ
end for
return Encpk (θ )
end procedure
5.3 Application to Private Support Vector
Machine Training
Finally, we focus on the classic ℓ2-regularized binary linear SVM
problem with hinge loss, which is given in the following form:
L(w) := 1|D |
∑
∀(xi ,yi )∈D
max{0, 1 − yi ⟨w,xi ⟩} + λ∥w ∥22 , (4)
where (xi ,yi ) ∈ Rd ×{−1, 1} is a feature vector, class label pair,w ∈
Rd is the model weight vector, and λ is the regularized coefficient.
From the aggregator perspective, specified in Algorithm 5, the
process of SVM training is similar to that of neural network training.
Each query to the data parties is defined as K epochs of training.
Once query responses are received, model parameters are averaged
to generate a new support vector machine model. This new model
is then sent to the data parties for another K epochs of training. We
again specify a pre-determined number of epochs E to control the
number of training iterations.
Algorithm 5 Private SVM Learning: Aggregator
Input: Set of data parties P; minimum number of honest, non-colluding parties t ;
noise parameter σ ; learning rate η; loss function L; clipping value c ; number of
epochs E ; number of epochs per query K , public key pk
t¯ = n − t + 1
Initialize model M with random weightsw ;
for each e ∈ [E/K ] do
Asynchronously query P:
train_epoch(M , η, K , L, c , σ , t )
θe = decrypted aggregate, noisy parameters from P
M ← θe
end for
return M
To complete an epoch of learning at each data party, we iterate
through each instance in the local training dataset Di . We again
deploy a clipping approach to constrain the sensitivity of the up-
dates. The model parameters are then updated according to the
loss function L as well as the noise parameter. The process con-
ducted at each data party for K epochs of training in response to
an aggregator query is outlined in Algorithm 6.
5.4 Expanding the Algorithm Repository
Beyond the three models evaluated here, our approach can be used
to extend any differentially private machine learning algorithm into
a federated learning environment. We demonstrate the flexibility
of our system through 3 example algorithms which are of broad
Algorithm 6 Private SVM Learning: Data Party Pi
procedure train_epoch(M , η, K , L, c , σ , t )
w = parameters of M
for each (xi , yi ) ∈ D do
xi ← xi / max
(
1, | |xi | |2c
)
end for
for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K } do
g(D) ← ▽wL(w, D)
g¯ ← g(D) + N
(
0, σ 2t−1
)
w ← w − ηg¯
M ← w
end for
return Encpk (w )
end procedure
interest and significantly different. The task of generating and de-
ploying our system for each algorithm, however, is non-trivial. First,
a DP version of the algorithm must be developed. Second, this must
be written as a series of queries. Finally, each query must have
an appropriate aggregation procedure. Our approach may then be
applied for accurate, federated, private results.
Due to our choices to use the threshold Paillier cryptosystem in
conjunction with an aggregator, rather than a complex SMC pro-
tocol run by the parties themselves, we can provide a streamlined
interface between the aggregator and the parties. Parties need only
answer data queries with encrypted, noisy responses and decryp-
tion queries with partial decryption values. Management of the
global model and communication with all other parties falls to the
aggregator, therefore decreasing the barrier to entry for parties to
engage in our federated learning system. Figure 4 demonstrates the
impact of this choice as our approach is able to effectively handle
the introduction of more parties into the federated learning system
without the introduction of increased encryption overhead.
Another issue in the deployment of new machine learning train-
ing algorithms is the choice of algorithmic parameters. Key deci-
sions must be made when using our system and many are domain-
specific. We aim to inform such decisions with our analysis of
trade-offs between privacy, trust and accuracy in Section 4.1.1, but
note that the impact will vary depending on the data and the train-
ing algorithm chosen. While our system will reduce the amount of
noise required to train any federated ML algorithm, questions sur-
rounding what impact various data-specific features will have on
the privacy budget are algorithm-specific. For example, Algorithm 2
demonstrates how, in decision tree training, the number of features
and classes impact the privacy budget at each level. Similarly, Al-
gorithms 4 and 6 show the role of norm clipping in neural network
and SVM learning. In neural networks, this value not only impacts
noise but will also have a different impact on learning depending
on the size of the network and number of features.
6 RELATEDWORK
Ourwork relates to both the areas of FL aswell as privacy-preserving
ML. Existing work can be classified into three categories: trusted
aggregator, local DP, and cryptographic.
Trusted Aggregator. Approaches in this area trust the aggregator
to obtain data in plaintext or add noise. [1] and [22] propose differ-
entially private ML systems, but do not consider a distributed data
scenario, thus requiring a central party. In [41], the authors develop
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a distributed data mining system with DP but show significant
accuracy loss and require a trusted aggregator to add noise.
Recently, [32] presented PATE, an ensemble approach to pri-
vate learning wherein several “teacher” models are independently
trained over local datasets. A trusted aggregator then provides a DP
query interface to a “student” model that has unlabelled public data
(but no direct access to private data) and obtains labels through
queries to the teachers. While we have proposed a federated learn-
ing (FL) approach wherein one global model is learned over the
aggregate of the parties’ datasets, the PATE method develops an
ensemble model with independently trained base models using
local datasets. Unlike the methods we evaluate, PATE assumes a
fully trusted party to aggregate the teachers’ labels; focuses on
scenarios wherein each party has enough data to train an accurate
model, which might not hold, e.g., for cellphone users training a
neural network; and assumes access to publicly available data, an
assumption not made in our FL system. Models produced from our
FL system learn from all available data, leading to more accurate
models than the local models trained by each participant in PATE
(Figure 4b in [32] demonstrates the need for a lot of parties to
achieve reasonable accuracy in such a setting).
Local Differential Privacy. [39] presents a distributed learning
system using DP without a central trusted party. However, the DP
guarantee is per-parameter and becomes meaningless for models
with more than a small number of parameters.
Cryptographic Approaches. [38] presents a protocol to privately
aggregate sums over multiple time periods. Their protocol is de-
signed to allow participants to periodically upload encrypted values
to an oblivious aggregator with minimum communication costs.
Their approach however has participants sending in a stream of
statistics and does not address FL or propose an FL system. Ad-
ditionally, their approach calls for each participant to add noise
independently. As our experimental results show, allowing each
participant to add noise in this fashion results in models with low
accuracy, making this approach is unsuitable for FL. In contrast, our
approach reduces the amount of noise injected by each participant
by taking advantage of the additive properties of DP and the use
of threshold-based homomorphic encryption to produce accurate
models that protect individual parties’ privacy.
In [6, §B] the authors propose the use of multiparty computation
to securely aggregate data for FL. The focus of the paper is to present
suitable cryptographic techniques to ensure that the aggregation
process can take place in mobile environments. While the authors
propose FL as motivation, no complete system is developed with
“a detailed study of the integration of differential privacy, secure
aggregation, and deep learning” remaining beyond the scope.
[4] provides a theoretical analysis on how differentially private
computations could be done in a federated setting for single in-
stance operations using either secure function evaluation or the
local model with a semi-trusted curator. By comparison, we consider
multiple operations to conduct FL and provide empirical evaluation
of the FL system. [29] proposes a system to perform differentially
private database joins. This approach combines private set intersec-
tion with random padding, but cannot be generally applied to FL.
In [33] the authors’ protocols are tailored to inner join tables and
counting the number of values in an array. In contrast, we propose
an accurate, private FL system for predictive model training.
Dwork et al. [14] present a distributed noise generation scheme
and focus on methods for generating noise from different distribu-
tions. This scheme is based on secret sharing, an MPC mechanism
that requires extensive exchange of messages and entails a commu-
nication overhead not viable in many federated learning settings.
[10] proposes a method to train neural networks in a private
collaborative fashion by combining MPC, DP and secret sharing
assuming non-colluding honest parties. In contrast, our system
prevents privacy leakages even if parties actively collude.
Approaches for the private collection of streaming data, includ-
ing [2, 8, 21, 37], aim to recover computation when one or more
parties go down. Our system, however, enables private federated
learning which allows for checkpoints in each epoch of training.
The use of threshold cryptography also enables our system to de-
crypt values when only a subset of the participants is available.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a novel approach to perform FL that com-
bines DP and SMC to improve model accuracy while preserving
provable privacy guarantees and protecting against extraction at-
tacks and collusion threats. Our approach can be applied to train
differentMLmodels in a federated learning fashion for varying trust
scenarios. Through adherence to the DP framework we are able
to guarantee overall privacy from inference of any model output
from our system as well as any intermediate result made available
to A or P. SMC additionally guarantees any messages exchanged
without DP protection are not revealed and therefore do not leak
any private information. This provides end-to-end privacy guar-
antees with respect to the participants as well as any attackers of
the model itself. Given these guarantees, models produced by our
system can be safely deployed to production without infringing on
privacy guarantees.
We demonstrated how to apply our approach to train a variety
of ML models and showed that it out-performs existing state-of-
the art techniques for FL. Our system provides significant gains in
accuracy when compared to a naïve application of state-of-the-art
differentially private protocols to FL systems.
For a tailored threat model, we propose an end-to-end private
federated learning system which uses SMC in combination with
DP to produce models with high accuracy. As far as we know
this is the first paper to demonstrate that the application of these
combined techniques allow us to maintain this high accuracy at
a given level of privacy over different learning approaches. In the
light of the ongoing social discussion on privacy, this proposed
approach provides a novel method for organizations to use ML in
applications requiring high model performance while addressing
privacy needs and regulatory compliance.
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